





### Field Asset Security in a Smart Grid World

#### **Darren Reece Highfill**


#### → Advanced Metering Infrastructure


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
























## Field Elements

#### Issues


- Limited or no control over physical access
- Wide range of logical access control
- Resource constrained devices
- Large quantity of devices

#### Requirements

- Device Identity
- Data Integrity
- Customer Privacy

#### Considerations

- Intelligence? (How much?)
- Filtering?



## Field Elements

#### **Network Management**


- Ad-hoc Structure or Predefined (Prescriptive)?
- Integrity, Availability of Provisioning Mechanism

#### **Authentication Mechanism**


- End-to-End or Step-by-Step?
- Bi-Directional ("Two-Way")
- Pre-Shared or Public Key?
- Customer Devices

#### Countermeasures

- Role-Based Access Control
- Least Privilege, Need-To-Know
- Unpredictable Credentials
- Intrusion Detection
- Tamper Detection



- At a substation? Somewhere in the field?
- Who owns the property? Is there a fence?
- Does it use wireless technology?
- What kind of access controls are implemented?



- How many homes are served? What is peak load?
- More than 300MW (~100,000 homes?) → NERC CIP?
- How does it authenticate / get authorized to the Data Center Aggregator?

# **Operations Center**

#### System Management Console


- Data Availability, Integrity
- Filtered View No Financial Data
- Time Sensitive (Freshness)

### **Field Communications**

- Data Integrity
- Temporal Privilege
- Strict Procedures
- Detailed Accounting

### Meter Data Management System

- Data Integrity, Confidentiality
- Multiple Interfaces, Heterogeneous Constraints



# **Public Interface**

#### Website


- Data Confidentiality
- Public (General Info) and Private (Customer) Views
- Consumer Portal Best Practices (e.g.: Financial Services)


#### **Customer Representative**

- Data Confidentiality, Integrity
- Filtered View Billing Related

#### Revenue

- Data Integrity, Confidentiality
- Non-Repudiation





# **Demand-Response**

#### **Energy Trader**

Regulated Relationship

### **Availability & Control**

- Data Confidentiality, Integrity
- Negotiated "Contract"
- Similarities to Dealing with an External Entity


# Vendors & Third Parties

#### **External Entities**

- Data Confidentiality
- Contractual Agreement
- Least Privilege, Need-To-Know




## **Security Strategy & Tactics**




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### **AMI Security Domains**




## **AMI-HAN Security Policy**




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## **AMI-SEC Task Force**

- AMI-SEC is concerned with securing AMI system elements.
  - Contextual Definition:
    - "...those measures that protect and defend AMI information and systems by assuring their ability to operate and perform in their intended manner in the face of malicious actions."






## AMI-SEC Task Force

Purpose



- Produce technical specification
  - Used by utilities to assess and procure
  - Used by OpenAMI part of AMI/DR Reference Design
- Determine baseline level of detail
  - Prescriptive in nature
  - Compliant products will have known functionality and robustness

### **AMI-SEC 2008 Deliverables**



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## **Timeline & Resource Challenges**

- AMI-SEC TF is volunteer-based
  - Operates like a standards body
  - 4 deliverables in 12 months aggressive schedule
  - Utilities are personnel resource constrained
- Deliverables done in December, 08?
  - Not good enough
  - Will have missed the window of opportunity



## **AMI Security Acceleration Project (ASAP)**

- Collaborative opportunity for electric utilities.
- Matching (\$1-for-\$1) funds from DOE for FFRDC participation.




- Assist in production of content for AMI-SEC
- Work products belong to AMI-SEC
- Accelerate and augment the activities of AMI-SEC





- Targeted augmentation of security requirements
  - Supplement to Risk Assessment / System Requirements
  - Goal of providing "drop-in" security section for RFP
- Additional benefits from collaborating organizations



## **Questions / Discussion**



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